Abstract
Leitgeb and Pettigrew argue that (1) agents should minimize the expected inaccuracy of their beliefs and (2) inaccuracy should be measured via the Brier score. They show that in certain diachronic cases, these claims require an alternative to Jeffrey Conditionalization. I claim that this alternative is an irrational updating procedure and that the Brier score, and quadratic scoring rules generally, should be rejected as legitimate measures of inaccuracy.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 413-424 |
Number of pages | 12 |
Journal | Philosophy of Science |
Volume | 79 |
Issue number | 3 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Jul 2012 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- History
- Philosophy
- History and Philosophy of Science