TY - JOUR
T1 - Learning Not to Diversify
T2 - The Transformation of Graduate Business Education and the Decline of Diversifying Acquisitions
AU - Jung, Jiwook
AU - Shin, Taekjin
N1 - Funding Information:
We gratefully acknowledge thoughtful comments and helpful guidance from Associate Editor Mauro Guillén and three anonymous reviewers. For helpful comments, we thank Ruth Aguilera, Richard Benton, Frank Dobbin, Neil Fligstein, Amit Kramer, Ryan Lamare, András Tilcsik, Shinjae Won, and seminar participants at the University of California at Irvine and the University of Illinois at Urbana–Champaign. We also thank Rajasri Roy Barman and Yin Lee for research assistance. Matthew Cain generously shared hostile takeover data with us.
Publisher Copyright:
© The Author(s) 2018.
PY - 2019/6/1
Y1 - 2019/6/1
N2 - Once a preferred strategy, corporate diversification into disparate lines of business has gradually declined in the U.S. over the past several decades. We argue that changes that occurred in a closely related domain—graduate business education—are important in understanding variation in de-diversification across firms. Building on a historical account of the transformation of business education, we explain how the rise of financial economics and agency-theoretic logic in business education changed students’ views about diversification. Nearly 20 years later, these MBA graduates rose to top decision-making positions and put the brakes on diversification. Using data on CEOs who ran 640 large U.S. corporations from 1985 to 2015, we show that CEOs who earned an MBA before the 1970s actively pursued diversification, whereas the next cohort of CEOs, who had been exposed to agency-theoretic logic in financial economics, refrained from it. We also demonstrate that the degree of managerial discretion moderated the effect of the CEO’s MBA education. Our study shows that institutional change in one domain (i.e., business education) contributed to change in another domain (i.e., corporate diversification), albeit with a considerable time lag.
AB - Once a preferred strategy, corporate diversification into disparate lines of business has gradually declined in the U.S. over the past several decades. We argue that changes that occurred in a closely related domain—graduate business education—are important in understanding variation in de-diversification across firms. Building on a historical account of the transformation of business education, we explain how the rise of financial economics and agency-theoretic logic in business education changed students’ views about diversification. Nearly 20 years later, these MBA graduates rose to top decision-making positions and put the brakes on diversification. Using data on CEOs who ran 640 large U.S. corporations from 1985 to 2015, we show that CEOs who earned an MBA before the 1970s actively pursued diversification, whereas the next cohort of CEOs, who had been exposed to agency-theoretic logic in financial economics, refrained from it. We also demonstrate that the degree of managerial discretion moderated the effect of the CEO’s MBA education. Our study shows that institutional change in one domain (i.e., business education) contributed to change in another domain (i.e., corporate diversification), albeit with a considerable time lag.
KW - corporate diversification
KW - graduate business education
KW - institutional change
KW - managerial cognition
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U2 - 10.1177/0001839218768520
DO - 10.1177/0001839218768520
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85044452683
SN - 0001-8392
VL - 64
SP - 337
EP - 369
JO - Administrative Science Quarterly
JF - Administrative Science Quarterly
IS - 2
ER -