Learning How to Strategically Disclose Information

Raj Kiriti Velicheti, Melih Bastopcu, S. Rasoul Etesami, Tamer Basar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Strategic information disclosure, in its simplest form, considers a game between an information provider (sender) who has access to some private information that an information receiver is interested in. While the receiver takes an action that affects the utilities of both players, the sender can design information (or modify beliefs) of the receiver through signal commitment, hence posing a Stackelberg game. However, obtaining a Stackelberg equilibrium for this game traditionally requires the sender to have access to the receiver's objective. In this work, we consider an online version of information design where a sender interacts with a receiver of an unknown type who is adversarially chosen at each round. Restricting attention to Gaussian prior and quadratic costs for the sender and the receiver, we show that O(√T) regret is achievable with full information feedback, where T is the total number of interactions between the sender and the receiver. Further, we propose a novel parametrization that allows the sender to achieve O(√T) regret for a general convex utility function. We then consider the Bayesian Persuasion problem with an additional cost term in the objective function, which penalizes signaling policies that are more informative and obtain O(log(T)) regret. Finally, we establish a sublinear regret bound for the partial information feedback setting and provide simulations to support our theoretical results.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2024 American Control Conference, ACC 2024
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages1604-1609
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9798350382655
DOIs
StatePublished - 2024
Event2024 American Control Conference, ACC 2024 - Toronto, Canada
Duration: Jul 10 2024Jul 12 2024

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Conference

Conference2024 American Control Conference, ACC 2024
Country/TerritoryCanada
CityToronto
Period7/10/247/12/24

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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