Abstract
The counter-intuitive implications of law necessitarianism pose a far more serious threat than its proponents recognize. Law necessitarians are committed to scientific essentialism, the thesis that there are metaphysically necessary truths which can be known only a posteriori. The most frequently cited arguments for this position rely on modal intuitions. Rejection of intuition thus threatens to undermine it. I consider ways in which law necessitarians might try to defend scientific essentialism without invoking intuition. I then consider ways in which law necessitarians who accept the general reliability of intuition might try to explain away the intuitions which conflict with their theory.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 649-657 |
Number of pages | 9 |
Journal | Philosophical Quarterly |
Volume | 55 |
Issue number | 221 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Oct 2005 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy