Key update at train stations: Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications

Sang Yoon Chang, Shaoying Cai, Hwajeong Seo, Yih Chun Hu

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Modern train systems adopt communication-based train control (CBTC), which uses wireless communications to better monitor and control the train operations. Despite the well-studied security issues in wireless networking in information technology applications, security implementations in trains have been lagging; many train systems rely on security by obscurity and forgo well-established security practices such as key updates. To secure train systems against increasingly evolving and persistent attackers and mitigate key breach (which can occur due to misuse of the key), we build a key update scheme, Key Update at Train Stations (KUTS), that leverages the inherent physical aspects of train operations (mobility/infrastructure-asymmetry between the stations and the trains and the operational differences when the trains are at stations and between the stations). Furthermore, by incorporating separation of key chain and use and on the entities providing the key seeds, KUTS protects the key seeds for future updates against the breach of the current key and is both key-collision irrelevant (thwarting known collision-based threats on one-way random functions) and system-compromise resilient (protecting the key secrecy even when the train system is compromised). We theoretically analyze KUTS’s effectiveness, security strength, and security properties. We also implement KUTS on various computing devices to study the performance overhead.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationSecurity and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings
EditorsRobert Deng, Vinod Yegneswaran, Jian Weng, Kui Ren
PublisherSpringer-Verlag
Pages125-143
Number of pages19
ISBN (Print)9783319596075
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2017
Event12th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2016 - Guangzhou, China
Duration: Oct 10 2016Oct 12 2016

Publication series

NameLecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST
Volume198 LNICST
ISSN (Print)1867-8211

Other

Other12th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2016
CountryChina
CityGuangzhou
Period10/10/1610/12/16

Fingerprint

Seed
Communication
Information technology

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications

Cite this

Chang, S. Y., Cai, S., Seo, H., & Hu, Y. C. (2017). Key update at train stations: Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. In R. Deng, V. Yegneswaran, J. Weng, & K. Ren (Eds.), Security and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings (pp. 125-143). (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST; Vol. 198 LNICST). Springer-Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59608-2_7

Key update at train stations : Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. / Chang, Sang Yoon; Cai, Shaoying; Seo, Hwajeong; Hu, Yih Chun.

Security and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings. ed. / Robert Deng; Vinod Yegneswaran; Jian Weng; Kui Ren. Springer-Verlag, 2017. p. 125-143 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST; Vol. 198 LNICST).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Chang, SY, Cai, S, Seo, H & Hu, YC 2017, Key update at train stations: Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. in R Deng, V Yegneswaran, J Weng & K Ren (eds), Security and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST, vol. 198 LNICST, Springer-Verlag, pp. 125-143, 12th EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2016, Guangzhou, China, 10/10/16. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59608-2_7
Chang SY, Cai S, Seo H, Hu YC. Key update at train stations: Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. In Deng R, Yegneswaran V, Weng J, Ren K, editors, Security and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings. Springer-Verlag. 2017. p. 125-143. (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST). https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59608-2_7
Chang, Sang Yoon ; Cai, Shaoying ; Seo, Hwajeong ; Hu, Yih Chun. / Key update at train stations : Two-layer dynamic key update scheme for secure train communications. Security and Privacy in Communication Networks -12th International Conference, SecureComm 2016, Proceedings. editor / Robert Deng ; Vinod Yegneswaran ; Jian Weng ; Kui Ren. Springer-Verlag, 2017. pp. 125-143 (Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, Social-Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, LNICST).
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