Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy: How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in "The Doctrine of Right"

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

Abstract

Contrary to the received view, I argue that Kant, in the "Doctrine of Right", outlines a third, republican alternative to absolutist and voluntarist conceptions of political legitimacy. According to this republican alternative, a state must meet certain institutional requirements before political obligations arise. An important result of this interpretation is not only that there are institutional restraints on a legitimate state's use of coercion, but also that the rights of the state ('public right') are not in principle reducible to the rights of individuals ('private right'). Thus, for Kant, political obligations are intimately linked to the existence of a certain kind of republican institutional framework.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)331-351
Number of pages21
JournalKant-Studien
Volume101
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Oct 1 2010

Fingerprint

Republican
Doctrine
Political Legitimacy
Conception
Political Obligation
Immanuel Kant
Restraint
Coercion
Absolutist

Keywords

  • justice
  • legitimacy
  • republicanism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

Cite this

Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy : How Public Right ‘Concludes’ Private Right in "The Doctrine of Right". / Varden, Helga.

In: Kant-Studien, Vol. 101, No. 3, 01.10.2010, p. 331-351.

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

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