Abstract
We formulate two general classes of M-player deterministic and stochastic nonzero-sum games where the players can be placed into two groups such that there are strong interactions within each group and a weak interaction between the two groups. This weak interaction is characterized in terms of a small parameter ε which, when set equal to zero, leads to two independent nonzero-sum games. Under the Nash equilibrium solution concept both within and in between the groups, we study the merits of an iterative method for the construction of the equilibrium by solving simpler problems at each stage of the iteration. In this iterative scheme, the zero'th order solution is the Nash equilibrium of the two independent games obtained by setting ε = 0, whereas the higher-order solutions are Nash equilibria of quadratic games, even though the original problem may have non-quadratic cost functions.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 245-256 |
| Number of pages | 12 |
| Journal | Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences |
| Volume | 156 |
| State | Published - Jan 1 1991 |
| Event | Proceedings of the 4th International Symposium on Differential Games and Applications - Helsinki, Finl Duration: Aug 9 1990 → Aug 10 1990 |
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Iterative computation of nash equilibria in M-player games with partial weak coupling. / Basar, M Tamer; Srikant, Rayadurgam.
In: Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences, Vol. 156, 01.01.1991, p. 245-256.Research output: Contribution to journal › Conference article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - Iterative computation of nash equilibria in M-player games with partial weak coupling
AU - Basar, M Tamer
AU - Srikant, Rayadurgam
PY - 1991/1/1
Y1 - 1991/1/1
N2 - We formulate two general classes of M-player deterministic and stochastic nonzero-sum games where the players can be placed into two groups such that there are strong interactions within each group and a weak interaction between the two groups. This weak interaction is characterized in terms of a small parameter ε which, when set equal to zero, leads to two independent nonzero-sum games. Under the Nash equilibrium solution concept both within and in between the groups, we study the merits of an iterative method for the construction of the equilibrium by solving simpler problems at each stage of the iteration. In this iterative scheme, the zero'th order solution is the Nash equilibrium of the two independent games obtained by setting ε = 0, whereas the higher-order solutions are Nash equilibria of quadratic games, even though the original problem may have non-quadratic cost functions.
AB - We formulate two general classes of M-player deterministic and stochastic nonzero-sum games where the players can be placed into two groups such that there are strong interactions within each group and a weak interaction between the two groups. This weak interaction is characterized in terms of a small parameter ε which, when set equal to zero, leads to two independent nonzero-sum games. Under the Nash equilibrium solution concept both within and in between the groups, we study the merits of an iterative method for the construction of the equilibrium by solving simpler problems at each stage of the iteration. In this iterative scheme, the zero'th order solution is the Nash equilibrium of the two independent games obtained by setting ε = 0, whereas the higher-order solutions are Nash equilibria of quadratic games, even though the original problem may have non-quadratic cost functions.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0025794719&partnerID=8YFLogxK
M3 - Conference article
AN - SCOPUS:0025794719
VL - 156
SP - 245
EP - 256
JO - Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences
JF - Lecture Notes in Control and Information Sciences
SN - 0170-8643
ER -