Invisible for both Camera and LiDAR: Security of multi-sensor fusion based perception in autonomous driving under physical-world attacks

Yulong Cao, Ningfei Wang, Chaowei Xiao, Dawei Yang, Jin Fang, Ruigang Yang, Qi Alfred Chen, Mingyan Liu, Bo Li

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

In Autonomous Driving (AD) systems, perception is both security and safety critical. Despite various prior studies on its security issues, all of them only consider attacks on camera-or LiDAR-based AD perception alone. However, production AD systems today predominantly adopt a Multi-Sensor Fusion (MSF) based design, which in principle can be more robust against these attacks under the assumption that not all fusion sources are (or can be) attacked at the same time. In this paper, we present the first study of security issues of MSF-based perception in AD systems. We directly challenge the basic MSF design assumption above by exploring the possibility of attacking all fusion sources simultaneously. This allows us for the first time to understand how much security guarantee MSF can fundamentally provide as a general defense strategy for AD perception.We formulate the attack as an optimization problem to generate a physically-realizable, adversarial 3D-printed object that misleads an AD system to fail in detecting it and thus crash into it. To systematically generate such a physical-world attack, we propose a novel attack pipeline that addresses two main design challenges: (1) non-differentiable target camera and LiDAR sensing systems, and (2) non-differentiable cell-level aggregated features popularly used in LiDAR-based AD perception. We evaluate our attack on MSF algorithms included in representative open-source industry-grade AD systems in real-world driving scenarios. Our results show that the attack achieves over 90% success rate across different object types and MSF algorithms. Our attack is also found stealthy, robust to victim positions, transferable across MSF algorithms, and physical-world realizable after being 3D-printed and captured by LiDAR and camera devices. To concretely assess the end-to-end safety impact, we further perform simulation evaluation and show that it can cause a 100% vehicle collision rate for an industry-grade AD system. We also evaluate and discuss defense strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages176-194
Number of pages19
ISBN (Electronic)9781728189345
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2021
Event42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021 - Virtual, San Francisco, United States
Duration: May 24 2021May 27 2021

Publication series

NameProceedings - IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Volume2021-May
ISSN (Print)1081-6011

Conference

Conference42nd IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP 2021
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityVirtual, San Francisco
Period5/24/215/27/21

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Safety, Risk, Reliability and Quality
  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications

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