Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability

Michael S. Moore

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0009

Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter

Abstract

This chapter examines the role that intention plays in defining the most serious forms of criminality. It argues that the criminal law as it now exists presupposes what is essentially a 'folk psychology' of intention, and proposes as an alternative a more nuanced and complex conception of intention that would take into account recent developments in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and moral psychology.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law
Publisher	Oxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)	9780191725265
ISBN (Print)	9780199559152
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0009
State	Published - May 1 2011

Keywords

Criminal law
Criminality
Folk psychology
Intentions
Moral responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences(all)

Access to Document

10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199559152.003.0009

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