Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Abstract

This chapter examines the role that intention plays in defining the most serious forms of criminality. It argues that the criminal law as it now exists presupposes what is essentially a 'folk psychology' of intention, and proposes as an alternative a more nuanced and complex conception of intention that would take into account recent developments in philosophy of mind, cognitive science, and moral psychology.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationPhilosophical Foundations of Criminal Law
PublisherOxford University Press
ISBN (Electronic)9780191725265
ISBN (Print)9780199559152
DOIs
StatePublished - May 1 2011

Fingerprint

psychology
Criminality
criminal law
science
philosophy

Keywords

  • Criminal law
  • Criminality
  • Folk psychology
  • Intentions
  • Moral responsibility

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences(all)

Cite this

Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability. / Moore, Michael.

Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, 2011.

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapter

Moore, Michael. / Intention as a Marker of Moral Culpability and Legal Punishability. Philosophical Foundations of Criminal Law. Oxford University Press, 2011.
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