Institutional Investors and the Information Production Theory of Stock Splits

Thomas J. Chemmanur, Gang Hu, Jiekun Huang

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

We make use of a large sample of transaction-level institutional trading data to test an extended version of Brennan and Hughes' (1991) information production theory of stock splits. We compare brokerage commissions paid by institutional investors before and after a split, assess the private information held by them, and relate the informativeness of their trading to brokerage commissions paid. We show that institutions make abnormal profits net of brokerage commissions by trading in splitting stocks. We also show that the information asymmetry faced by firms goes down after stock splits. Overall, our empirical results support the information production theory.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)413-445
Number of pages33
JournalJournal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
Volume50
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 16 2015

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Institutional investors
Information production
Production theory
Stock splits
Brokerage
Institutional trading
Information asymmetry
Empirical results
Profit
Private information
Informativeness

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

Cite this

Institutional Investors and the Information Production Theory of Stock Splits. / Chemmanur, Thomas J.; Hu, Gang; Huang, Jiekun.

In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 50, No. 3, 16.07.2015, p. 413-445.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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