Informational uniqueness of closed-loop Nash equilibria for a class of nonstandard dynamic games

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Abstract

This paper discusses an extension of the currently available theory of noncooperative dynamic games to game models whose state equations are of order higher than one. In a discrete-time framework, it first elucidates the reasons why the theory developed for first-order systems is not applicable to higher-order systems, and then presents a general procedure to obtain an informationally unique Nash equilibrium solution in the presence of random disturbances. A numerical example solved in the paper illustrates the general approach.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)409-419
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Optimization Theory and Applications
Volume46
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1985

Keywords

  • Dynamic games
  • Nash equilibrium solutions
  • closed-loop information patterns
  • noncooperative differential games
  • second-order systems
  • stochastic dynamics
  • uniqueness of equilibria

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Optimization
  • Management Science and Operations Research
  • Applied Mathematics

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