Abstract
This paper discusses an extension of the currently available theory of noncooperative dynamic games to game models whose state equations are of order higher than one. In a discrete-time framework, it first elucidates the reasons why the theory developed for first-order systems is not applicable to higher-order systems, and then presents a general procedure to obtain an informationally unique Nash equilibrium solution in the presence of random disturbances. A numerical example solved in the paper illustrates the general approach.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 409-419 |
Number of pages | 11 |
Journal | Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications |
Volume | 46 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Aug 1985 |
Keywords
- Dynamic games
- Nash equilibrium solutions
- closed-loop information patterns
- noncooperative differential games
- second-order systems
- stochastic dynamics
- uniqueness of equilibria
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Control and Optimization
- Management Science and Operations Research
- Applied Mathematics