Informational robustness of competitive equilibria

Stefan Krasa, Wayne Shafer

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


Consider an exchange economy with complete information. We perturb this economy by assuming that each agent's observation about the true state of the world is noisy. The paper investigates the robustness of equilibria of the complete information economy with respect to incomplete information. We provide conditions under which complete information equilibria are limits of equilibria of the economies with incomplete information, as the noise in the signal converges to zero. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D51, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)494-518
Number of pages25
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Issue number2
StatePublished - 2001

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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