TY - JOUR
T1 - Information systems in treaty regimes
AU - Dai, Xinyuan
N1 - Funding Information:
* I thank Damon Coletta, Paul Diehl, Daniel Drezner, James Fearon, Robert Keohane, Charles Lipson, Sharon Morris, Charles Myers, Robert Pahre, Michel Regenwetter, Duncan Snidal, and the anonymous reviewersfortheir very helpful comments on previous drafts, as well as Douglas Stinnet for excellent editorial assistance. Financial support from the MacArthur Foundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace is gratefully acknowledged. 1 Robert O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Funding Information:
61 For example, in 1994 the International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (IUCN) had an annual budget of nearly 57 million Swiss francs and a staff of more than five hundred. For another example, the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) is financially supported by over five million contributors. See John Lanchbery, "Long-Term Trends in Systems for Implementation Review in International Agreements on Fauna and Flora," in David G. Victor, Kal Raustiala, and Eugene B. Skolnikoff, eds., The Implementation and Effectiveness ofInternationalEnvironmental Commitments: Theory and Practice (Cambridge: MT Press, 1998), 65-66. 62 Owen Greene, "The System for Implementation Review in the Ozone Regime," in Victor, Raustiala, and Skolnikoff (fh. 61), 183-84. 63 Chayes and Chayes (fn. 7), 164-65. 64 Kal Raustiala, "The 'Participatory Revolution' in International Environmental Law," Harvard Environmental Law Review 21 (Summer 1997), 561. 65Mitchell (fh. 15). 66 Kamen Sachariew, "Promoting Compliance with International Environmental Legal Standards:
PY - 2002/7
Y1 - 2002/7
N2 - One of the most influential arguments in international relations is that international institutions influence states' behavior by monitoring their their compliance with treaties, which in turn facilitates reciprocity. Empirically, however, many treaty organizations are not mandated to monitor compliance. The article develops a parsimonious theoretical framework to address the empirical diversity of monitoring arrangements. By mapping strategic environments onto monitoring arrangements, it accounts for who detects noncompliance and who brings it to light. In particular, two factors-the interest alignment between noncompliance victims and their states and the availability of noncompliance victims as low-cost monitors-largely shape the organizational forms of information systems. This simple theory sheds light on a wide range of substantively important treaty regimes.
AB - One of the most influential arguments in international relations is that international institutions influence states' behavior by monitoring their their compliance with treaties, which in turn facilitates reciprocity. Empirically, however, many treaty organizations are not mandated to monitor compliance. The article develops a parsimonious theoretical framework to address the empirical diversity of monitoring arrangements. By mapping strategic environments onto monitoring arrangements, it accounts for who detects noncompliance and who brings it to light. In particular, two factors-the interest alignment between noncompliance victims and their states and the availability of noncompliance victims as low-cost monitors-largely shape the organizational forms of information systems. This simple theory sheds light on a wide range of substantively important treaty regimes.
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U2 - 10.1353/wp.2002.0013
DO - 10.1353/wp.2002.0013
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036664051
SN - 0043-8871
VL - 54
SP - 405
EP - 436
JO - World Politics
JF - World Politics
IS - 4
ER -