Abstract
We examine whether proxy advisory firms (PAs) serve primarily an information intermediary role by providing research and voting recommendations to shareholders, or directly influence executive compensation by exerting pressure on firms to adopt preferred pay practices. Through a field study, we find that PAs are perceived as both information intermediaries and agenda setters and that these roles provide leverage to enable PAs to exercise significant influence over executive pay practices. Boards feel, and sometimes yield to, pressure to conform to PA “best” practices despite their own preferred compensation philosophies, even in the absence of overt PA scrutiny or negative shareholder votes. We also find that PAs are susceptible to conflicts of interest and generally use a “one-size-fits-all” approach to voting recommendations. Overall, however, PAs are viewed as improving compensation practices by increasing transparency and accountability and fostering dialogue between firms and their shareholders.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 969-1011 |
Number of pages | 43 |
Journal | Journal of Accounting Research |
Volume | 57 |
Issue number | 4 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2019 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- G230
- G340
- M410
- M520
- corporate governance
- executive compensation
- field study
- proxy advisors
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Accounting
- Finance
- Economics and Econometrics