@article{318fd9e297f2447a98008179beb3eea3,
title = "Incentive efficiency of stock versus options",
abstract = "This paper examines the relative incentive costs of using stock versus options in management incentive contracts that use market price as the performance measure. We establish that if the manager's effort has little or no effect on a firm's operating risk, then the cost of incentive risk is less using stock rather than options. However, this result is reversed if the manager's effort has a significant impact on the firm's operating risk.",
keywords = "Employee stock options, Executive compensation, Incentive efficiency",
author = "Feltham, \{Gerald A.\} and Wu, \{Martin G.H.\}",
note = "Jerry is thankful for financial support from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council (SSRC) of Canada. This paper extends work that was part of Martin{\textquoteright}s dissertation, some of which was contained in an earlier working paper entitled: {\textquotedblleft}Why Should Shareholders Pay CEO Options/Stocks?{\textquotedblright} Martin wishes to thank Tony Atkinson, Jeffrey Callen, Joel Demski, Alex Dontoh, Frank Gigler, Steve Huddart, Raffi Indjejikian, Alan Kraus, Jon Lundesgaard, Mary M. Margiotta, D. J. Nanda, Joshua Ronen, Bharat Sarath, Bill Scott, Naomi Soderstrom, Bin Srinidhi, Bin Xiang, and seminar participants at NYU, the 1996 AAA Northeastern regional meeting, the 1996 European Accounting Association meeting, the 1997 Canadian AAA meeting, the 1997 AAA meeting, the Eighth Financial Economics and Accounting meeting, the 1997 joint workshop of NYU and Columbia University, and Fourth International Conference on Contemporary Accounting Issues. Martin is grateful for financial support from the Faculty of Commerce of UBC and Leonard N. Stern School of Business of NYU.",
year = "2001",
doi = "10.1023/A:1011377902967",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "6",
pages = "7--28",
journal = "Review of Accounting Studies",
issn = "1380-6653",
publisher = "Springer New York",
number = "1",
}