Incentive design and utility learning via energy disaggregation

Lillian J. Ratliff, Roy Dong, Henrik Ohlsson, S. Shankar Sastry

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

The utility company has many motivations for modifying energy consumption patterns of consumers such as revenue decoupling and demand response programs. We model the utility company-consumer interaction as a reverse Stackelberg game and present an iterative algorithm to design incentives for consumers while estimating their utility functions. Incentives are designed using the aggregated as well as the disaggregated (device level) consumption data. We simulate the iterative control (incentive design) and estimation (utility learning and disaggregation) process for examples.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication19th IFAC World Congress IFAC 2014, Proceedings
EditorsEdward Boje, Xiaohua Xia
PublisherIFAC Secretariat
Pages3158-3163
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9783902823625
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014 - Cape Town, South Africa
Duration: Aug 24 2014Aug 29 2014

Publication series

NameIFAC Proceedings Volumes (IFAC-PapersOnline)
Volume19
ISSN (Print)1474-6670

Other

Other19th IFAC World Congress on International Federation of Automatic Control, IFAC 2014
CountrySouth Africa
CityCape Town
Period8/24/148/29/14

Keywords

  • Economic design
  • Energy management systems
  • Game theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering

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