Abstract
First, Krawiec's policy suggestion overstates the impact of the legal sanction on corporate behavior. The legal sanction is only one of several sanctions imposed for organizational misconduct. The public relations effect of misconduct may harm organizations more than any legal sanction, giving them an incentive to implement compliance programs that assure the public of the organization's compliance with the law. Second, Krawiec does not consider utility that is derived from reducing the public's subjective perception of the likelihood of misconduct. This placebo effect that exists whether a compliance program is objectively effective or not, may increase utility by offsetting behavioral biases that cause the public to overestimate the probability of organizational misconduct.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Article number | 16 |
| Pages (from-to) | 763-780 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Flordia State University Law Review |
| Volume | 32 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| State | Published - 2005 |
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In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs. / Aviram, Amitai.
In: Flordia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, No. 2, 16, 2005, p. 763-780.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
}
TY - JOUR
T1 - In Defense of Imperfect Compliance Programs
AU - Aviram, Amitai
PY - 2005
Y1 - 2005
N2 - In Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, Professor Krawiec argues that organizations have perverse incentives to implement ineffective compliance programs, and supports this argument with a survey of empirical research. Based on her argument she urges that organizations be held strictly liable to corporate crimes (in terms of both guilt and punishment), regardless of the implementation of a compliance program by the accused organization. Assuming arguendo that criminal law's current treatment of compliance programs gives organizations an incentive to design inefficient programs, this Article posits that corporate crime may be better deterred if criminal law embraces, rather than remains agnostic to, compliance programs.First, Krawiec's policy suggestion overstates the impact of the legal sanction on corporate behavior. The legal sanction is only one of several sanctions imposed for organizational misconduct. The public relations effect of misconduct may harm organizations more than any legal sanction, giving them an incentive to implement compliance programs that assure the public of the organization's compliance with the law. Second, Krawiec does not consider utility that is derived from reducing the public's subjective perception of the likelihood of misconduct. This placebo effect that exists whether a compliance program is objectively effective or not, may increase utility by offsetting behavioral biases that cause the public to overestimate the probability of organizational misconduct.
AB - In Organizational Misconduct: Beyond the Principal-Agent Model, Professor Krawiec argues that organizations have perverse incentives to implement ineffective compliance programs, and supports this argument with a survey of empirical research. Based on her argument she urges that organizations be held strictly liable to corporate crimes (in terms of both guilt and punishment), regardless of the implementation of a compliance program by the accused organization. Assuming arguendo that criminal law's current treatment of compliance programs gives organizations an incentive to design inefficient programs, this Article posits that corporate crime may be better deterred if criminal law embraces, rather than remains agnostic to, compliance programs.First, Krawiec's policy suggestion overstates the impact of the legal sanction on corporate behavior. The legal sanction is only one of several sanctions imposed for organizational misconduct. The public relations effect of misconduct may harm organizations more than any legal sanction, giving them an incentive to implement compliance programs that assure the public of the organization's compliance with the law. Second, Krawiec does not consider utility that is derived from reducing the public's subjective perception of the likelihood of misconduct. This placebo effect that exists whether a compliance program is objectively effective or not, may increase utility by offsetting behavioral biases that cause the public to overestimate the probability of organizational misconduct.
M3 - Article
VL - 32
SP - 763
EP - 780
JO - Florida State University law review. Florida State University. College of Law
JF - Florida State University law review. Florida State University. College of Law
SN - 0096-3070
IS - 2
M1 - 16
ER -