TY - GEN
T1 - Impact of Malicious SCADA Commands on Power Grids' Dynamic Responses
AU - Lin, Hui
AU - Kalbarczyk, Zbigniew
AU - Iyer, Ravishankar K.
N1 - Funding Information:
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This material is based upon work supported in part by: (1) the National Science Foundation under award number CNS 1314891. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; and (2) the Department of Energy under award number DE-OE0000780. Neither the United States Government not any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or any agency thereof. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or any agency thereof.
Funding Information:
This material is based upon work supported in part by: (1) the National Science Foundation under award number CNS 1314891. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; and (2) the Department of Energy under award number DEOE0000780.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2018 IEEE.
PY - 2018/12/24
Y1 - 2018/12/24
N2 - Control-related attacks can use malicious commands crafted in legitimate formats to initiate perturbations to power systems. Our previous work used the steady state of power systems (e.g., through power flow analysis) to estimate the consequences of such commands [1]. However, when power systems move from one steady state to another, their physical components go through a transient period, during which the system state can experience oscillations. An anomaly in an oscillation can make power systems lose synchronisms and experience catastrophic consequences. Analysis based on the steady state cannot understand and predict those harmful oscillations. In this paper, we study the impacts of control-related attacks on the dynamic responses of a power grid, by mapping malicious commands (e.g., that disconnect transmission lines) delivered via communication networks to power systems' electromechanical models. Based on theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that it is challenging for attackers to destabilize a power system, but they can introduce large oscillations in the transient period and thereby cause physical damage.
AB - Control-related attacks can use malicious commands crafted in legitimate formats to initiate perturbations to power systems. Our previous work used the steady state of power systems (e.g., through power flow analysis) to estimate the consequences of such commands [1]. However, when power systems move from one steady state to another, their physical components go through a transient period, during which the system state can experience oscillations. An anomaly in an oscillation can make power systems lose synchronisms and experience catastrophic consequences. Analysis based on the steady state cannot understand and predict those harmful oscillations. In this paper, we study the impacts of control-related attacks on the dynamic responses of a power grid, by mapping malicious commands (e.g., that disconnect transmission lines) delivered via communication networks to power systems' electromechanical models. Based on theoretical analysis and numerical simulations, we find that it is challenging for attackers to destabilize a power system, but they can introduce large oscillations in the transient period and thereby cause physical damage.
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U2 - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2018.8587462
DO - 10.1109/SmartGridComm.2018.8587462
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85061053379
T3 - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018
BT - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018
PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
T2 - 2018 IEEE International Conference on Communications, Control, and Computing Technologies for Smart Grids, SmartGridComm 2018
Y2 - 29 October 2018 through 31 October 2018
ER -