Humanity, empathy, and the self: Comments on Samuel Fleischacker’s Being Me Being You

In Being Me Being You (BMBY), Samuel Fleischacker offers a novel interpretation of Smith’s conception of empathy—or ‘sympathy’, as Smith referred to the phenomenon—and defends the importance of this conception of empathy for ethical theory. The book is a treasure trove of intricate discussions of various conceptions of empathy—primarily contagion versus projection accounts and the ways they map onto Hume’s and Smith’s respective moral philosophies—as well as of the differences between empathy and other types of emotional reactions. Fleischacker also brings Smithian empathy into conversation with empirical work, discussing the relationship between Smith’s work and cognitive psychology, empirical work on novels and empathy, empathy and altruism, and whether animals experience empathy. Furthermore, he discusses the importance of culture for Smith’s conception of empathy and uses this conception of empathy to offer a response to the worry that empathy goes out far more readily to members of limited social groups around us. Finally, Fleischacker responds to challenges posed to moral systems that rely on empathy, discusses empathy and the limits of utilitarianism, and examines the relations between empathy and demonization. My focus in this commentary will be relatively narrow: I will be critically assessing only the second chapter of Fleischacker’s book, where he makes use of Smith’s account of empathy to develop a distinctive Smithian conception of ‘humanity’. Despite the shortcomings discussed below, his discussion of Smithian humanity is, to my mind, one of the most sophisticated and impressive philosophical commentaries on Smith’s thought.