How to measure the deterrence effects of merger policy: Frequency or composition?

Pedro P. Barros, Joseph A. Clougherty, Jo Seldeslachts

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)1-8
Number of pages8
JournalInternational Journal of the Economics of Business
Volume17
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2010

Keywords

  • Antitrust
  • Deterrence
  • Merger policy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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