Abstract
We show that the number of merger proposals (frequency-based deterrence) is a more appropriate indicator of underlying changes in merger policy than the relative anti-competitiveness of merger proposals (composition-based deterrence). This has strong implications for the empirical analysis of the deterrence effects of merger policy enforcement, and potential implications regarding how to reduce anti-competitive merger proposals.
Original language | English (US) |
---|---|
Pages (from-to) | 1-8 |
Number of pages | 8 |
Journal | International Journal of the Economics of Business |
Volume | 17 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 2010 |
Keywords
- Antitrust
- Deterrence
- Merger policy
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Business, Management and Accounting (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics