TY - JOUR
T1 - “Honor thy father and thy mother” or not
T2 - uncertain family aid and the design of social long term care insurance
AU - Canta, Chiara
AU - Cremer, Helmuth
AU - Gahvari, Firouz
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2020, Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany, part of Springer Nature.
PY - 2020/12/1
Y1 - 2020/12/1
N2 - We study the role and the design of long-term care insurance programs when informal care is uncertain; with and without active actuarially-fair private insurance markets against dependency. Three types of public insurance policies are considered: (1) a topping-up scheme, (2) an opting-out scheme, and (3) an opting-out-cum-transfer scheme which combines elements of the first two. A topping-up scheme can never do better than private insurance; opting out and opting-out-cum-transfer schemes can because they provide some insurance against the default of informal care. Long-term care policies have different implications for crowding out. A topping-up policy entails crowding out at both intensive and extensive margins and an opting-out policy leads to crowding out solely at the extensive margin. The opting-out feature of an opting-out-cum-transfer policy too leads to crowding out at the extensive margin, but its transfer element leads to crowding out at the intensive margin and crowding in at the extensive margin.
AB - We study the role and the design of long-term care insurance programs when informal care is uncertain; with and without active actuarially-fair private insurance markets against dependency. Three types of public insurance policies are considered: (1) a topping-up scheme, (2) an opting-out scheme, and (3) an opting-out-cum-transfer scheme which combines elements of the first two. A topping-up scheme can never do better than private insurance; opting out and opting-out-cum-transfer schemes can because they provide some insurance against the default of informal care. Long-term care policies have different implications for crowding out. A topping-up policy entails crowding out at both intensive and extensive margins and an opting-out policy leads to crowding out solely at the extensive margin. The opting-out feature of an opting-out-cum-transfer policy too leads to crowding out at the extensive margin, but its transfer element leads to crowding out at the intensive margin and crowding in at the extensive margin.
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U2 - 10.1007/s00355-020-01260-4
DO - 10.1007/s00355-020-01260-4
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85086106359
SN - 0176-1714
VL - 55
SP - 687
EP - 734
JO - Social Choice and Welfare
JF - Social Choice and Welfare
IS - 4
ER -