Hierarchical network games with various types of public and private information

Hongxia Shen, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider, in this paper, a class of hierarchical network games where there is a single service provider (leader, in a Stackelberg game framework) and multiple users (followers) which could be of different types. Depending on whether the type of a particular user is private information (only to that user), or public information (shared with all users as well as the service provider), or whether we have the intermediate case where this is common (shared) information among the users but not shared with the service provider, one can introduce and study the equilibria of different types of games, covering the entire gamut from complete information to incomplete information games. We undertake such a study in this paper, with general utility functions for the players and general distributions for user characteristics. We compare the performances of the leader and the followers under the different scenarios, and also study the asymptotic case as the user population grows. The study for the many-followers regime provides useful insight for communication network applications.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2006, CDC
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2825-2830
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)1424401712, 9781424401710
DOIs
StatePublished - 2006
Event45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2006, CDC - San Diego, CA, United States
Duration: Dec 13 2006Dec 15 2006

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370

Other

Other45th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control 2006, CDC
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CitySan Diego, CA
Period12/13/0612/15/06

Keywords

  • Bayesian equilibrium
  • Nash equilbrium
  • Private information
  • Public information
  • Stackelberg game
  • Wardrop equilibrium

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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