TY - JOUR
T1 - Herding and anti-herding
T2 - A model of reputational differentiation
AU - Effinger, Matthias R.
AU - Polborn, Mattias K.
PY - 2001/4/28
Y1 - 2001/4/28
N2 - We analyze a model related to the strategic herding litetature where a second expert maximizes his expected second period value by conforming with a first expert ('herding'). In contrast to the herding literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. If the value of being the only smart agent is sufficiently large, the second expert always opposes its predecessor's report; otherwise, herding may result.
AB - We analyze a model related to the strategic herding litetature where a second expert maximizes his expected second period value by conforming with a first expert ('herding'). In contrast to the herding literature we assume that an agent is most valuable if he is the only smart agent. If the value of being the only smart agent is sufficiently large, the second expert always opposes its predecessor's report; otherwise, herding may result.
KW - Career concerns
KW - Herding
KW - Strategic communication
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0035046147&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0035046147&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00070-2
DO - 10.1016/S0014-2921(00)00070-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0035046147
SN - 0014-2921
VL - 45
SP - 385
EP - 403
JO - European Economic Review
JF - European Economic Review
IS - 3
ER -