God knows (but does God believe?)

Dylan Murray, Justin Sytsma, Jonathan Livengood

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


The standard view in epistemology is that propositional knowledge entails belief. Positive arguments are seldom given for this entailment thesis, however; instead, its truth is typically assumed. Against the entailment thesis, Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel (Noûs, forthcoming) report that a non-trivial percentage of people think that there can be propositional knowledge without belief. In this paper, we add further fuel to the fire, presenting the results of four new studies. Based on our results, we argue that the entailment thesis does not deserve the default status that it is typically granted. We conclude by considering the alternative account of knowledge that Myers-Schulz and Schwitzgebel propose to explain their results, arguing that it does not explain ours. In its place we offer a different explanation of both sets of findings-the conviction account, according to which belief, but not knowledge, requires mental assent.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)83-107
Number of pages25
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number1
StatePublished - Oct 2013


  • Belief
  • Capacity-tendency account
  • Conviction account
  • Entailment thesis
  • Knowledge
  • Mental assent

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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