### Abstract

This paper presents a general method for derivation of a tight lower bound on the Stackelberg cost of the leader in general two-person deterministic games with partial dynamic state information. The method converts the original dynamic Stackelberg problem into two open-loop optimization problems whose solutions can readily be obtained using the standard techniques of optimization and optimal control theory. When applied to the class of linear-quadratic dynamic games with partial dynamic information, defined on general Hilbert spaces, each one of these open-loop optimization problems becomes a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints, thus allowing for an explicit computation of the Stackelberg cost value.

Original language | English (US) |
---|---|

Pages (from-to) | 47-56 |

Number of pages | 10 |

Journal | Large Scale Systems |

Volume | 3 |

Issue number | 1 |

State | Published - Jan 1 1982 |

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### ASJC Scopus subject areas

- Engineering(all)

### Cite this

*Large Scale Systems*,

*3*(1), 47-56.

**GENERAL THEORY FOR STACKELBERG GAMES WITH PARTIAL STATE INFORMATION.** / Basar, Tamer.

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article

*Large Scale Systems*, vol. 3, no. 1, pp. 47-56.

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - GENERAL THEORY FOR STACKELBERG GAMES WITH PARTIAL STATE INFORMATION.

AU - Basar, Tamer

PY - 1982/1/1

Y1 - 1982/1/1

N2 - This paper presents a general method for derivation of a tight lower bound on the Stackelberg cost of the leader in general two-person deterministic games with partial dynamic state information. The method converts the original dynamic Stackelberg problem into two open-loop optimization problems whose solutions can readily be obtained using the standard techniques of optimization and optimal control theory. When applied to the class of linear-quadratic dynamic games with partial dynamic information, defined on general Hilbert spaces, each one of these open-loop optimization problems becomes a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints, thus allowing for an explicit computation of the Stackelberg cost value.

AB - This paper presents a general method for derivation of a tight lower bound on the Stackelberg cost of the leader in general two-person deterministic games with partial dynamic state information. The method converts the original dynamic Stackelberg problem into two open-loop optimization problems whose solutions can readily be obtained using the standard techniques of optimization and optimal control theory. When applied to the class of linear-quadratic dynamic games with partial dynamic information, defined on general Hilbert spaces, each one of these open-loop optimization problems becomes a quadratic programming problem with linear constraints, thus allowing for an explicit computation of the Stackelberg cost value.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0020090748&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0020090748&partnerID=8YFLogxK

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0020090748

VL - 3

SP - 47

EP - 56

JO - Large Scale Systems

JF - Large Scale Systems

SN - 0167-420X

IS - 1

ER -