Gaussian cheap talk game with quadratic cost functions: When herding between strategic senders is a virtue

Farhad Farokhi, André M.H. Teixeira, Cédric Langbort

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider a Gaussian cheap talk game with quadratic cost functions. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the estimation error variance, however, the cost function of each senders contains an extra term which is captured by its private information. Following the cheap talk literature, we model this problem as a game with asymmetric information. We start by the single sender case in which the receiver also has access to a noisy but honest side information in addition to the message transmitted by a strategic sender. We generalize this setup to multiple sender case. For the multiple sender case, we observe that if the senders are not herding (i.e., copying each other policies), the quality of the receiver's estimation degrades rapidly as the number of senders increases.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2014 American Control Conference, ACC 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages2267-2272
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781479932726
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Event2014 American Control Conference, ACC 2014 - Portland, OR, United States
Duration: Jun 4 2014Jun 6 2014

Publication series

NameProceedings of the American Control Conference
ISSN (Print)0743-1619

Other

Other2014 American Control Conference, ACC 2014
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPortland, OR
Period6/4/146/6/14

Keywords

  • Agents-based systems
  • Estimation
  • Networked control systems

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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