Game-theoretic approach to feedback-driven multi-stage moving target defense

The static nature of computer networks allows malicious attackers to easily gather useful information about the network using network scanning and packet sniffing. The employment of secure perimeter firewalls and intrusion detection systems cannot fully protect the network from sophisticated attacks. As an alternative to the expensive and imperfect detection of attacks, it is possible to improve network security by manipulating the attack surface of the network in order to create a moving target defense. In this paper, we introduce a proactive defense scheme that dynamically alters the attack surface of the network to make it difficult for attackers to gather system information by increasing complexity and reducing its signatures. We use concepts from systems and control literature to design an optimal and efficient multi-stage defense mechanism based on a feedback information structure. The change of attack surface involves a reconfiguration cost and a utility gain resulting from risk reduction. We use information- and control-theoretic tools to provide closed-form optimal randomization strategies. The results are corroborated by a case study and several numerical examples.