Abstract
This paper examines the link between federalism, rent-seeking and free-riding behaviour. Using data from the Canadian dairy industry, we test four hypotheses of the determinants of rent-seeking expenditure and the role of free-riding. First, we find that provinces do not cooperate with each other when lobbying the federal government for trade protection. Second, some provinces are found to free ride on the rent-seeking expenditure of the larger (more influential) provinces. Third, the cost of rent-seeking increases when the federal government is forced to make a decision regarding the future of the protectionist policies. Fourth, institutional changes under the 1994 GATT raised the rent-seeking cost of maintaining protectionist policies.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 145-162 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Journal | Canadian Public Policy |
| Volume | 29 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jun 2003 |
| Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Public Administration