Fragility and robust design of optimal auctions

Georgios Kotsalis, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

We consider the fragility problem of optimal auctions under a general class of preference relations and type spaces. We show that in generic settings feasibility of optimal auctions relies on the principals exact knowledge of the preference relations of the bidders. In the absence of such exact knowledge, a self-interested bidder will find it profitable to either misreport her private information or not participate at the auction. This phenomenon is a manifestation of fragility. Given this limitation we design auctions that are robust to model misspecification by leveraging tools from robust optimization, while maintaining computational tractability.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publication2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
PublisherIEEE Computer Society
Pages248-253
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)9781479934096
DOIs
StatePublished - 2013
Externally publishedYes
Event51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013 - Monticello, IL, United States
Duration: Oct 2 2013Oct 4 2013

Publication series

Name2013 51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013

Other

Other51st Annual Allerton Conference on Communication, Control, and Computing, Allerton 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMonticello, IL
Period10/2/1310/4/13

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Control and Systems Engineering

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