We examine the dynamics of member-to-member and member-to-candidate campaign contributions in the U.S. House. We hypothesize that MCs’ parties’ choices about contributions serve as a cue for individual members in their own giving. Some MCs will follow these party cues [by giving to the same MCs or challengers that party leaders and/or the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee (DCCC) or National Republican Congressional Committee (NRCC) prioritizes in their giving], and others will strike their own course. We expect that these decisions will manifest themselves in MCs’ legislative success, with those who follow their party most closely enjoying favored treatment from the leadership. Our analyses focus on campaign contributions in the 2002 and 2004 election cycles (2001-2002 and 2003-2004) and subsequent legislative success in the 108th and 109th Congresses (2003-2004 and 2005-2006). The results show that party and leadership giving does indeed serve as a cue, that the importance of the cue varies depending on the context of the giving decision, that it is stronger for some MCs than for others, and that these differences affect their subsequent success in the chamber.
|Original language||English (US)|
|Number of pages||38|
|State||Published - Aug 1 2011|
|Name||APSA 2011 Annual Meeting Paper|