TY - GEN
T1 - FlipDyn in Graphs
T2 - 15th International Conference on Decision and Game Theory for Security, GameSec 2024
AU - Banik, Sandeep
AU - Bopardikar, Shaunak D.
AU - Hovakimyan, Naira
N1 - This research was supported in part by i) the NSF Award CNS-2134076 under the Secure and Trustworthy Cyberspace (SaTC) program, ii) the NSF CAREER Award ECCS-2236537, and iii) AFOSR FA9550-21-1-0411.
PY - 2025
Y1 - 2025
N2 - We present FlipDyn-G, a dynamic game model extending the FlipDyn framework to a graph-based setting, where each node represents a dynamical system. This model captures the interactions between a defender and an adversary who strategically take over nodes in a graph to minimize (resp. maximize) a finite horizon additive cost. At any time, the FlipDyn state is represented as the current node, and each player can transition the FlipDyn state to a node based on the connectivity from the current node. Such transitions are driven by the node dynamics, state, and node-dependent costs. This model results in a hybrid dynamical system where the discrete state (FlipDyn state) governs the continuous state evolution and the corresponding state cost. Our objective is to compute the Nash equilibrium of this finite horizon zero-sum game on a graph. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we model and characterize the FlipDyn-G game for general dynamical systems, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for scalar linear discrete-time dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the system. Additionally, for a finite state birth-death Markov chain (represented as a graph) under scalar linear dynamical systems, we derive analytical expressions for the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values. We illustrate our findings through numerical studies involving epidemic models and linear dynamical systems with adversarial interactions.
AB - We present FlipDyn-G, a dynamic game model extending the FlipDyn framework to a graph-based setting, where each node represents a dynamical system. This model captures the interactions between a defender and an adversary who strategically take over nodes in a graph to minimize (resp. maximize) a finite horizon additive cost. At any time, the FlipDyn state is represented as the current node, and each player can transition the FlipDyn state to a node based on the connectivity from the current node. Such transitions are driven by the node dynamics, state, and node-dependent costs. This model results in a hybrid dynamical system where the discrete state (FlipDyn state) governs the continuous state evolution and the corresponding state cost. Our objective is to compute the Nash equilibrium of this finite horizon zero-sum game on a graph. Our contributions are two-fold. First, we model and characterize the FlipDyn-G game for general dynamical systems, along with the corresponding Nash equilibrium (NE) takeover strategies. Second, for scalar linear discrete-time dynamical systems with quadratic costs, we derive the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values independent of the continuous state of the system. Additionally, for a finite state birth-death Markov chain (represented as a graph) under scalar linear dynamical systems, we derive analytical expressions for the NE takeover strategies and saddle-point values. We illustrate our findings through numerical studies involving epidemic models and linear dynamical systems with adversarial interactions.
KW - Dynamical Systems
KW - Game Theory
KW - Graphs
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85207659847&partnerID=8YFLogxK
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U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-74835-6_11
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-74835-6_11
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85207659847
SN - 9783031748349
T3 - Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
SP - 220
EP - 239
BT - Decision and Game Theory for Security - 15th International Conference, GameSec 2024, Proceedings
A2 - Sinha, Arunesh
A2 - Fu, Jie
A2 - Zhu, Quanyan
A2 - Zhang, Tao
PB - Springer
Y2 - 16 October 2024 through 18 October 2024
ER -