Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Lichun Li; Eric Feron; Jeff S. Shamma

doi:10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Lichun Li, Eric Feron, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

In asymmetric zero-sum games, one player has superior information about the game over the other. It is known that the informed players (maximizer) face the tradeoff of exploiting its superior information at the cost of revealing its superior information, but the basic point of the uninformed player (minimizer)'s decision making remains unknown. This paper studies the finite stage asymmetric repeated games from both players' viewpoints, and derives that not only security strategies but also the opponents' corresponding best responses depends only on the informed player's history action sequences. Moreover, efficient LP formulations to compute both player's security strategies are provided.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	5310-5315
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781509018376
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083
State	Published - Dec 27 2016
Externally published	Yes
Event	55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016 - Las Vegas, United States Duration: Dec 12 2016 → Dec 14 2016

Publication series

Name	2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016

Other

Other	55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016
Country/Territory	United States
City	Las Vegas
Period	12/12/16 → 12/14/16

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Artificial Intelligence
Decision Sciences (miscellaneous)
Control and Optimization

Online availability

10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

Library availability

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Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints. / Li, Lichun; Feron, Eric; Shamma, Jeff S.
2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2016. p. 5310-5315 7799083 (2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Li, L, Feron, E & Shamma, JS 2016, Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints. in 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016., 7799083, 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 5310-5315, 55th IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016, Las Vegas, United States, 12/12/16. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2016.7799083

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Finite stage asymmetric repeated games: Both players' viewpoints

Abstract

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Other

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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