Recent work has shown that traffic analysis of data carried on encrypted tunnels can be used to recover important se-mantic information. As one example, attackers can find out which website, or which page on a website, a user is access-ing simply by monitoring the traffic patterns. We show that traffic analysis is a much greater threat to privacy than pre-viously thought, as such attacks can be carried out remotely. In particular, we show that, to perform traffic analysis, ad-versaries do not need to directly observe the traffic patterns. Instead, they can send probes from a far-off vantage point that exploit a queuing side channel in routers. We demonstrate the threat of such remote traffic anal-ysis by developing a remote website fingerprinting attack that works against home broadband users. Because the ob-servations obtained by probes are more noisy than direct observations, we had to take a new approach to detection that uses the full time series data contained in the observa-tion, rather than summary statistics used in previous work. We perform k-nearest neighbor classification using dynamic time warping (DTW) distance metric. We find that in our experiments, we are able to fingerprint a website with 80% accuracy in both testbed and target system. This shows that remote traffic analysis represents a real threat to privacy on the Internet.