An undirected graph G = (V,E) is stable if its inessential vertices (those that are exposed by at least one maximum matching) form a stable set. We call a set of edges F ⊆ E a stabilizer if its removal from G yields a stable graph. In this paper we study the following natural edge-deletion question: given a graph G = (V,E), can we find a minimum-cardinality stabilizer? Stable graphs play an important role in cooperative game theory. In the classic matching game introduced by Shapley and Shubik  we are given an undirected graph G = (V,E) where vertices represent players, and we define the value of each subset S ⊆ V as the cardinality of a maximum matching in the subgraph induced by S. The core of such a game contains all fair allocations of the value of V among the players, and is well-known to be non-empty iff graph G is stable. The stabilizer problem addresses the question of how to modify the graph to ensure that the core is non-empty. We show that this problem is vertex-cover hard. We then prove that there is a minimum-cardinality stabilizer that avoids some maximum matching of G. We use this insight to give efficient approximation algorithms for sparse graphs and for regular graphs.