Family firms and labor market regulation

Morten Bennedsen, Sterling Huang, Hannes F. Wagner, Stefan Zeume

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


In a panel across twenty-eight countries over 10 years, we show that family firms on average enjoy performance advantages over nonfamily firms only when labor markets are less regulated. We confirm this result in a matched firm sample using a survey-based instrument as a family control. Furthermore, family firms exhibit lower variation in employment levels in less-regulated labor markets, supporting the notion that labor relations drive family firms' performance advantages. Our results are consistent with the notion that both family ownership and labor market reforms provide employment protection and thus partly substitute as governance mechanisms.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)348-379
Number of pages32
JournalReview of Corporate Finance Studies
Issue number2
StatePublished - Sep 1 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Finance
  • Business and International Management


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