Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Disputes

Justin Sytsma, Jonathan M Livengood

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle


One view of philosophy that is sometimes expressed, especially by scientists, is that while philosophers are good at asking questions, they are poor at producing convincing answers. And the perceived divide between philosophical and scientific methods is often pointed to as the major culprit behind this lack of progress. Looking back at the history of philosophy, however, we find that this methodological divide is a relatively recent invention. Further, it is one that has been challenged over the past decade by the modern incarnation of experimental philosophy. How might the reincorporation of empirical methods into philosophy aid the process of making philosophical progress? Building off of the work of Sytsma (2010), we argue that one way it does so is by offering a means of resolving some disputes that arise in philosophy. We illustrate how philosophical disputes may sometimes be resolved empirically by looking at the recent experimental literature on intuitions about reference.
Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number9
Pages (from-to)145-160
JournalEssays in Philosophy
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2012


Dive into the research topics of 'Experimental Philosophy and Philosophical Disputes'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this