Exogenous empirical-evidence equilibria in perfect-monitoring repeated games yield correlated equilibria

Nicolas Dudebout, Jeff S. Shamma

Research output: Contribution to journalConference articlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper proves that exogenous empirical-evidence equilibria (xEEEs) in perfect-monitoring repeated games induce correlated equilibria of the associated one-shot game. An empirical-evidence equilibrium (EEE) is a solution concept for stochastic games. At equilibrium, agents' strategies are optimal with respect to models of their opponents. These models satisfy a consistency condition with respect to the actual behavior of the opponents. As such, EEEs replace the full-rationality requirement of Nash equilibria by a consistency-based bounded-rationality one. In this paper, the framework of empirical evidence is summarized, with an emphasis on perfect-monitoring repeated games. A less constraining notion of consistency is introduced. The fact that an xEEE in a perfect-monitoring repeated game induces a correlated equilibrium on the underlying one-shot game is proven. This result and the new notion of consistency are illustrated on the hawk-dove game. Finally, a method to build specific correlated equilibria from xEEEs is derived.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number7039539
Pages (from-to)1167-1172
Number of pages6
JournalProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume2015-February
Issue numberFebruary
DOIs
StatePublished - 2014
Externally publishedYes
Event2014 53rd IEEE Annual Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2014 - Los Angeles, United States
Duration: Dec 15 2014Dec 17 2014

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization

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