Ex Post Efficiency in the Buyer's Bid Double Auction When Demand Can Be Arbitrarily Larger Than Supply

Eleftherios Zacharias, Steven R. Williams

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

We examine the rate of convergence to efficiency in the buyer's bid double auction for sequences of markets in which the number m of buyers can be arbitrarily larger than the number n of sellers. This rate is shown to be O(n/m2) when m, n are such that m≥βn for a constant β>1. This is consistent with the O(1/m) rate that holds when 1/β≤n/m≤β, which is proven by A. Rustichini et al. (1994, Econometrica62, 1041-1063). Consequently, the single formula O(n/m2) developed in this paper expresses the rate of convergence to efficiency for all sequences of m and n for which n/m is bounded above. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C78, G14.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)175-190
Number of pages16
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume97
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2001

Keywords

  • Double auction; bargaining; market microstructure

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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