TY - CONF
T1 - Estimating the probability of multiple misloads in spent fuel casks for light water reactor systems
AU - Jarrah, Ibrahim
AU - Rizwan-Uddin,
N1 - The financial support for this project was provided by the United States Department of Energy through the Nuclear Energy University Program under the Contract No. DE-NE0008529. The findings presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. We thank Prof. Zahra Mohaghegh for several constructive comments and for help in estimating the probability of error of repeated tasks (Section IV.B).
The financial support for this project was provided by the United States Department of Energy through the Nuclear Energy University Program under the Contract No. DENE0008529. The findings presented herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the sponsor. We thank Prof. Zahra Mohaghegh for several constructive comments and for help in estimating the probability of error of repeated tasks (Section IV.B).
PY - 2019
Y1 - 2019
N2 - The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.
AB - The spent fuel dry cask should remain subcritical under normal, abnormal, and accident conditions. The cask may become susceptible to criticality if it is misloaded with assemblies that do not conform with the Certificate of Compliance (CoC). Based on the criticality calculations, the cask needs to be misloaded with more than one fuel assemblies and has an accident in order to become susceptible to criticality. Quantification of the risk of having a misloaded cask may help reduce the conservatism in the cask designs and eliminate unnecessary steps in the spent fuel handling and loading procedure. In this paper, the probability of misloading a cask with more than one light water reactor (PWR and BWR) fuel assemblies is quantified using a combination of event tree and fault trees. An event tree is built to predict all multiple misloads scenarios. Six multiple misloads scenarios are identified from the tree. The probabilities of the six scenarios and the total probability are calculated for casks for both reactor types. The multiple misloads probabilities are found to be 6.73E-07 and 7.55E-06 for PWR and BWR fuels, respectively. In addition, the probability of multiple misloads is calculated as a function of the cask capacity.
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M3 - Paper
AN - SCOPUS:85067107961
SP - 232
EP - 241
T2 - 16th International Topical Meeting on Probabilistic Safety Assessment and Analysis, PSA 2019
Y2 - 28 April 2019 through 4 May 2019
ER -