Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions

Rajiv T. Maheswaran; Tamer Başar

doi:10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960

Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

The application of economic ideas to control electronic technology is an emerging design paradigm. In network and computational settings, divisible auctions are a viable tool for regulation of services such as bandwidth and processing share. Often, the performance of an agent in the system depends simultaneously on the allocation received from several resources. In this paper, we investigate the extension of a proportionally fair divisible auction to the case where agents' utilities have complementarities across multiple resources. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under various symmetry conditions. We propose a negotiation algorithm and prove that under relaxation, the scheme is locally stable for particular agent characterizations.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Publisher	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages	5939-5944
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Print)	0780379241
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960
State	Published - 2003
Event	42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control - Maui, HI, United States Duration: Dec 9 2003 → Dec 12 2003

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Volume	6
ISSN (Print)	0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)	2576-2370

Other

Other	42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Country/Territory	United States
City	Maui, HI
Period	12/9/03 → 12/12/03

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Control and Systems Engineering
Modeling and Simulation
Control and Optimization

Online availability

10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960

Library availability

Discover UIUC Full Text

Cite this

Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions. / Maheswaran, Rajiv T.; Başar, Tamer.
Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., 2003. p. 5939-5944 (Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control; Vol. 6).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Maheswaran, RT & Başar, T 2003, Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions. in Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control. Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, vol. 6, Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc., pp. 5939-5944, 42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control, Maui, HI, United States, 12/9/03. https://doi.org/10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960

@inproceedings{104fe1a735db4ffebd1c6ae76d567336,

title = "Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions",

abstract = "The application of economic ideas to control electronic technology is an emerging design paradigm. In network and computational settings, divisible auctions are a viable tool for regulation of services such as bandwidth and processing share. Often, the performance of an agent in the system depends simultaneously on the allocation received from several resources. In this paper, we investigate the extension of a proportionally fair divisible auction to the case where agents' utilities have complementarities across multiple resources. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under various symmetry conditions. We propose a negotiation algorithm and prove that under relaxation, the scheme is locally stable for particular agent characterizations.",

author = "Maheswaran, {Rajiv T.} and Tamer Ba{\c s}ar",

year = "2003",

doi = "10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960",

language = "English (US)",

isbn = "0780379241",

series = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",

publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",

pages = "5939--5944",

booktitle = "Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control",

address = "United States",

note = "42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control ; Conference date: 09-12-2003 Through 12-12-2003",

}

TY - GEN

T1 - Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions

AU - Maheswaran, Rajiv T.

AU - Başar, Tamer

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - The application of economic ideas to control electronic technology is an emerging design paradigm. In network and computational settings, divisible auctions are a viable tool for regulation of services such as bandwidth and processing share. Often, the performance of an agent in the system depends simultaneously on the allocation received from several resources. In this paper, we investigate the extension of a proportionally fair divisible auction to the case where agents' utilities have complementarities across multiple resources. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under various symmetry conditions. We propose a negotiation algorithm and prove that under relaxation, the scheme is locally stable for particular agent characterizations.

AB - The application of economic ideas to control electronic technology is an emerging design paradigm. In network and computational settings, divisible auctions are a viable tool for regulation of services such as bandwidth and processing share. Often, the performance of an agent in the system depends simultaneously on the allocation received from several resources. In this paper, we investigate the extension of a proportionally fair divisible auction to the case where agents' utilities have complementarities across multiple resources. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under various symmetry conditions. We propose a negotiation algorithm and prove that under relaxation, the scheme is locally stable for particular agent characterizations.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1542318447&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=1542318447&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960

DO - 10.1109/CDC.2003.1271960

M3 - Conference contribution

AN - SCOPUS:1542318447

SN - 0780379241

T3 - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

SP - 5939

EP - 5944

BT - Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

PB - Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.

T2 - 42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control

Y2 - 9 December 2003 through 12 December 2003

ER -

Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions

Abstract

Publication series

Other

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Online availability

Library availability

Related links

Fingerprint

Cite this