Equilibrium and Negotiation in Multiple Resource Auctions

Rajiv T. Maheswaran, Tamer Başar

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution


The application of economic ideas to control electronic technology is an emerging design paradigm. In network and computational settings, divisible auctions are a viable tool for regulation of services such as bandwidth and processing share. Often, the performance of an agent in the system depends simultaneously on the allocation received from several resources. In this paper, we investigate the extension of a proportionally fair divisible auction to the case where agents' utilities have complementarities across multiple resources. We show the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium under various symmetry conditions. We propose a negotiation algorithm and prove that under relaxation, the scheme is locally stable for particular agent characterizations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Number of pages6
ISBN (Print)0780379241
StatePublished - 2003
Event42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control - Maui, HI, United States
Duration: Dec 9 2003Dec 12 2003

Publication series

NameProceedings of the IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
ISSN (Print)0743-1546
ISSN (Electronic)2576-2370


Other42nd IEEE Conference on Decision and Control
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityMaui, HI

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Control and Systems Engineering
  • Modeling and Simulation
  • Control and Optimization


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