TY - JOUR
T1 - Entrepreneurs, risk aversion, and dynamic firms
AU - Herranz, Neus
AU - Krasa, Stefan
AU - Villamil, Anne P.
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2015 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2015/10
Y1 - 2015/10
N2 - How do entrepreneurs vary firm size, capital structure, and default to manage risk? We show that more risk-averse entrepreneurs run smaller, more highly leveraged firms and default less, because running a smaller firm with higher debt reduces personal funds at risk in the firm. Optimal default depends on ex ante debt, consumption forgone from firm liquidation, and owner capacity to inject funds. We show that entrepreneurs sacrifice current consumption in the hope of future success that never materializes for the bottom 25 percent, but entrepreneurship is a path toward great wealth and high consumption for the top quartile.
AB - How do entrepreneurs vary firm size, capital structure, and default to manage risk? We show that more risk-averse entrepreneurs run smaller, more highly leveraged firms and default less, because running a smaller firm with higher debt reduces personal funds at risk in the firm. Optimal default depends on ex ante debt, consumption forgone from firm liquidation, and owner capacity to inject funds. We show that entrepreneurs sacrifice current consumption in the hope of future success that never materializes for the bottom 25 percent, but entrepreneurship is a path toward great wealth and high consumption for the top quartile.
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U2 - 10.1086/682678
DO - 10.1086/682678
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:84945404646
SN - 0022-3808
VL - 123
SP - 1133
EP - 1176
JO - Journal of Political Economy
JF - Journal of Political Economy
IS - 5
ER -