Abstract
Utility companies have many motivations for modifying energy consumption patterns of consumers such as revenue decoupling and demand response programs. We model the utility company-consumer interaction as a principal-agent problem and present an iterative algorithm for designing incentives while estimating the consumer's utility function.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages | 57-58 |
| Number of pages | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2014 |
| Externally published | Yes |
| Event | 2014 3rd ACM International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems, HiCoNS 2014, Part of CPSWeek 2014 - Berlin, Germany Duration: Apr 15 2014 → Apr 17 2014 |
Other
| Other | 2014 3rd ACM International Conference on High Confidence Networked Systems, HiCoNS 2014, Part of CPSWeek 2014 |
|---|---|
| Country/Territory | Germany |
| City | Berlin |
| Period | 4/15/14 → 4/17/14 |
Keywords
- Energy disaggregation
- Game theory
- Incentive design
- Utility learning
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Computer Networks and Communications