Enabling Privacy-Preserving Incentives for Mobile Crowd Sensing Systems

Haiming Jin, Lu Su, Bolin Ding, Klara Nahrstedt, Nikita Borisov

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the proliferation of mobile crowd sensing (MCS) systems that leverage the public crowd equipped with various mobile devices (e.g., smartphones, smartglasses, smartwatches) for large scale sensing tasks. Because of the importance of incentivizing worker participation in such MCS systems, several auction-based incentive mechanisms have been proposed in past literature. However, these mechanisms fail to consider the preservation of workers' bid privacy. Therefore, different from prior work, we propose a differentially private incentive mechanism that preserves the privacy of each worker's bid against the other honest-but-curious workers. The motivation of this design comes from the concern that a worker's bid usually contains her private information that should not be disclosed. We design our incentive mechanism based on the single-minded reverse combinatorial auction. Specifically, we design a differentially private, approximately truthful, individual rational, and computationally efficient mechanism that approximately minimizes the platform's total payment with a guaranteed approximation ratio. The advantageous properties of the proposed mechanism are justified through not only rigorous theoretical analysis but also extensive simulations.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings - 2016 IEEE 36th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2016
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages344-353
Number of pages10
ISBN (Electronic)9781509014828
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 8 2016
Event36th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2016 - Nara, Japan
Duration: Jun 27 2016Jun 30 2016

Publication series

NameProceedings - International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Volume2016-August

Other

Other36th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems, ICDCS 2016
CountryJapan
CityNara
Period6/27/166/30/16

Keywords

  • incentive mechanism
  • mobile crowd sensing
  • privacy-preserving

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Hardware and Architecture
  • Software

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