Employee Privacy, American Values, and the Law: The Kenneth M. Piper Lecture

nce
between
employee
privacy
and
other
competing
interests,
as
evidenced
by
survey
data
indicating
a
general
concurrence
between
employee
and
managerial
perceptions.'
Consequently,
he
is
skeptical
of
the
claims
of
"privacy
fundamentalists"
who
would
uncouple
the
very
idea
of
privacy
from
its
moorings,
as
evidenced
by
their
use
of
the
word
to
attack
the
computerized
monitoring
of
work.
He
concludes
that
our
"system"-an
"eclectic
blend"
of
common
law,
statutes,
and
contract-is
in
keeping
with
our
values
far
more
than
alternatives
found
in
Europe
which,
in
the
data
protection
area,
are
occupied
by
comprehensive
(and
intrusive)
public
licensing
and
regulatory
bodies.
I
am
far
less
sanguine.
I
believe
we
often
fail
to
protect
the
essen-
tials
of
what
the
law
ought
to
protect,
that
our
law
is
discordant
with
our
values
as
expressed
historically
and
in
our
common
parlance.
Ac-
cordingly,
I
will
suggest
that
some
of
the
survey
data
relied
upon
should
be
more
a
source
of
disquiet
than
of
satisfaction.
Only
on
the
last
point,
in
the
European
comparison,
does
Westin
touch
upon
a
deeply
rooted
cultural
value;
however,
I
will
argue
that
a
comparison
to
Europe
in
general
and
to
Germany
in
particular
is
especially
useful
because
it
emphasizes
both
the
poverty
of
our
legal
conception
and
our
institutional
inability
to
protect
significant
employee
privacy
interests.
I
do
not
suggest
that
these
profound
differences
are
unique
to
us.
Westin
advances
a
widely
shared
progressive
faith
in
enlightened
man-
agement,
perhaps
chastened
when
need
be
by
the
market;
hence,
the
reliance
on
survey
data,
for
management
could
scarcely
act
freely
against
overwhelming
employee
opposition,
even
if
unorganized.
I
should
like
to
think
that
the
views
I
will
express
draw
from
even
stronger
historical
roots,
and
if
not
currently
shared
by
a
great
many
in
positions
of
power-judges
and
legislators-may
yet
persuade