Abstract
Many recommendation and decision processes depend on eliciting evaluations of opportunities, products, and vendors. A scoring system is devised that induces honest reporting of feedback. Each rater merely reports a signal, and the system applies proper scoring rules to the implied posterior beliefs about another rater's report. Honest reporting proves to be a Nash equilibrium. The scoring schemes can be scaled to induce appropriate effort by raters and can be extended to handle sequential interaction and continuous signals. We also address a number of practical implementation issues that arise in settings such as academic reviewing and online recommender and reputation systems.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 1359-1373 |
Number of pages | 15 |
Journal | Management Science |
Volume | 51 |
Issue number | 9 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Sep 2005 |
Externally published | Yes |
Keywords
- Electronic markets
- Honest feedback
- Proper scoring rules
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Strategy and Management
- Management Science and Operations Research