@inproceedings{fdee2ddcbcd84e91b101e50ff62a8ea4,
title = "Ekiden: A platform for confidentiality-preserving, trustworthy, and performant smart contracts",
abstract = "Smart contracts are applications that execute on blockchains. Today they manage billions of dollars in value and motivate visionary plans for pervasive blockchain deployment. While smart contracts inherit the availability and other security assurances of blockchains, however, they are impeded by blockchains' lack of confidentiality and poor performance. We present Ekiden, a system that addresses these critical gaps by combining blockchains with Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs). Ekiden leverages a novel architecture that separates consensus from execution, enabling efficient TEE-backed confidentiality-preserving smart-contracts and high scalability. Our prototype (with Tendermint as the consensus layer) achieves example performance of 600x more throughput and 400x less latency at 1000x less cost than the Ethereum mainnet. Another contribution of this paper is that we systematically identify and treat the pitfalls arising from harmonizing TEEs and blockchains. Treated separately, both TEEs and blockchains provide powerful guarantees, but hybridized, though, they engender new attacks. For example, in na{\"i}ve designs, privacy in TEE-backed contracts can be jeopardized by forgery of blocks, a seemingly unrelated attack vector. We believe the insights learned from Ekiden will prove to be of broad importance in hybridized TEE-blockchain systems.",
keywords = "blockchain, confidentiality preserving smart contracts, smart contracts, trusted hardware",
author = "Raymond Cheng and Fan Zhang and Jernej Kos and Warren He and Nicholas Hynes and Noah Johnson and Ari Juels and Andrew Miller and Dawn Song",
note = "Funding Information: We also wish to thank Iddo Bentov, Joe Near, Chang Liu, Jian Liu, and Lun Wang for their helpful feedback and discussion. We also thank Pranav Gaddamadugu and Andy Wang for their contributions to application development. This material is in part based upon work supported by the Center for Long-Term Cybersecurit,yDARPA (award number N66001-15-C-4066) IC3 industry partners, and the National Science Foundation (NSF award numbers TWC-1518899 CNS-1330599, CNS-1514163, CNS-1564102, CNS-1704615, and ARO W911NF-16-1-0145). This work was also supported in part by FORCES (Foundations Of Resilient CybEr-Physical Systems), which receives support from the National Science Foundation (NSF award numbers CNS-1238959, CNS-1238962, CNS-1239054, CNS-1239166). Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2019 IEEE.; 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EURO S and P 2019 ; Conference date: 17-06-2019 Through 19-06-2019",
year = "2019",
month = jun,
doi = "10.1109/EuroSP.2019.00023",
language = "English (US)",
series = "Proceedings - 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EURO S and P 2019",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "185--200",
booktitle = "Proceedings - 4th IEEE European Symposium on Security and Privacy, EURO S and P 2019",
address = "United States",
}