Abstract
This paper concerns ex ante incentive efficient performance in the bargaining of one buyer and one seller over a single item. For any element in a specified class of distributions of the buyer's and the seller's valuations of the item, all of the (interim) individually rational and efficient allocation rules are characterized. It is also shown that the "buyer's bid" and the "seller's price" double auctions are efficient for all distributions in the specified class. These results are obtained by studying efficiency as a linear programming problem.
Original language | English (US) |
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Pages (from-to) | 154-172 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
Volume | 41 |
Issue number | 1 |
DOIs | |
State | Published - Feb 1987 |
Externally published | Yes |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics