Efficient performance in two agent bargaining

Steven R. Williams

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

This paper concerns ex ante incentive efficient performance in the bargaining of one buyer and one seller over a single item. For any element in a specified class of distributions of the buyer's and the seller's valuations of the item, all of the (interim) individually rational and efficient allocation rules are characterized. It is also shown that the "buyer's bid" and the "seller's price" double auctions are efficient for all distributions in the specified class. These results are obtained by studying efficiency as a linear programming problem.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)154-172
Number of pages19
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume41
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1987

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Efficient performance in two agent bargaining'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this