TY - JOUR
T1 - Efficiency in partnerships with joint monitoring
AU - Miller, Nolan H.
N1 - Funding Information:
* I thank Nabil Al-Najjar, Matthew Jackson, and Steve Matthews, as well as Tom Fields, Elizabeth Lacey, Amit Pazgal, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments. Financial support from a National Science Foundation Graduate Research Fellowship is gratefully acknowledged. All errors are mine.
PY - 1997/12
Y1 - 1997/12
N2 - This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification numbers: C7, D7, D8, L2
AB - This paper examines deterministic partnerships where a single partner observes the actions taken by a subset of the other partners and issues a report conditional on that observation. No other partner has any additional information. In such a model, whenever the observing partner can see the action chosen by at least one other partner, the efficient action vector can be sustained in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium by sharing rule that exhibits budget balance and limited liability.Journal of Economic Literatureclassification numbers: C7, D7, D8, L2
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U2 - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2332
DO - 10.1006/jeth.1997.2332
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0031539391
SN - 0022-0531
VL - 77
SP - 285
EP - 299
JO - Journal of Economic Theory
JF - Journal of Economic Theory
IS - 2
ER -