Effects of subjective biases on strategic information transmission

Venkata Sriram Siddhardh Nadendla, Cedric Langbort, Tamer Basar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, we study the effects of subjective biases on strategic information transmission (SIT) within a Stackelberg game setting, where a human transmitter (leader) communicates an encoded source message to a human receiver (follower) so that the receiver decodes back a desired version of the original source signal. We model human decisions using Rieger-Wang's prospect theory, which is an extension of traditional prospect theory to continuous decision spaces. Having found a closed-form expression for the receiver's best response strategy under any general setting, we consider two settings: Gaussian SIT games and exponential SIT games. While the Gaussian SIT games result in strategies that are independent of subjective biases of both the transmitter and the receiver, we show that the equilibrium strategies in exponential SIT games depend on the subjective biases of both the transmitter and the receiver. Numerical results are presented to illustrate results in both Gaussian and exponential settings.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Article number8444442
Pages (from-to)6040-6049
Number of pages10
JournalIEEE Transactions on Communications
Volume66
Issue number12
DOIs
StatePublished - Dec 2018

Keywords

  • Gaussian test channel
  • Strategic information transmission
  • exponential test channel
  • prospect theory

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Electrical and Electronic Engineering

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